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Law as we know and conceive of it is a product of the modern state.  Most of us, especially in 
law schools, think of rules as being primarily enacted by the legislature or administrative 
agencies; we think of courts as the primary adjudicative institutions; and we think of 
enforcement as being a product of state bureaucrats, including police and prosecutors. As has 
been long recognized, however, such imagery is a radically incomplete, even within the zone of 
the nation-state.1  It is an especially poor fit when one examines groups at the periphery of 
nation-states who operate quasi-legal systems of varying degrees of efficacy and persistence.  
These systems provide a good deal of “order without (state) law.”2 
 
This essay analyzes the Pashtunwalli, the tribal code of the Pashtuns, from a political economy 
perspective.   The Pashtuns are the ethnic group of some 40 million that occupies a large swath 
of territory across Afghanistan and Pakistan that has never been completely integrated into a 
state.3  The decade- long conflict in Afghanistan has brought renewed attention to the 
Pashtuns, whose members are prominent in both the pseudo-government and the Taliban.  The 
tribal code is a central element of Pashtun identity: indeed, it is said “to be a Pashtun to 
observe the Pashtunwalli.”4   
 
Though it bears some similarity with customary laws of other Afghan tribes, the Pashtun 
customs are distinctive both for their persistence and harshness. They form the primary 
normative rules in force in the region: governments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have 
tenuous reach into the areas where many Pashtuns live, and in some cases have no contact at 
                                                                
 Thanks to Daniel Rosengard for research assistance and to Daniel Abebe, Peter Leeson, Richard McAdams and 
Lesley Wexler for helpful comments.  I am especially indebted to Aziz Huq for extensive comments. 
1 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008); DAVID 
FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER (2001). 
2 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
3 Akbar S. Ahmed, MILLENNIUM AND CHARISMA AMONG THE PATHANS, A CRITICAL ESSAY IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 92, 99 
(1976) (“…external political history has been a constant struggle to maintain its boundaries against larger state 
systems attempting to capture, cage, subjugate or encapsulate it.”) *NOTE: MIGHT BE AHMED 1980, cited in next 
fn.] 
4 See e.g., Pashtoonwali, at http://www.khyber.org/culture/pashtunwali.shtml (“Pukhtoonwali, Pukhto and 
Pukhtoon have become almost synonymous terms; Asta Olesen, ISLAM AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN 33 (1995).  Note, 
however, that urban and educated Pashtuns disdain this image. Declan Walsh, Arithmetic on the Frontier, 112 
GRANTA 161, 171 (2010). 
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all with these populations.  Afghanistan has never really had a central government with 
effective reach throughout the country, and Pakistani criminal and civil law does not apply, 
even nominally, in the so-called Tribal Areas of the Northwest Frontier Province.5  
 
Many of the harsh rules of the previous Taliban government have their origin in Pashtun 
custom, rather than classical Islamic sources; in particular the treatment of women has 
garnered a good deal of negative attention in recent years.  The Pashtunwalli, it is implied, is a 
barbaric code, whose replacement with modern law would be an advance for all concerned. 
This way of framing the problem contrasts a primitive rural population with the enlightened 
moderns who live under the rule of law.  Bringing law to the barbarian is a modern mission 
civilisatrice, and helps to justify a continued western presence in Afghanistan.6 
 
I argue, instead, that the Pashtunwalli has a particular logic of its own, and is an example of 
what Richard McAdams and I called in another context “adjudication under anarchy.”7  In a 
society in which there is no effective state government, citizens will have to develop alternative 
ways of resolving disputes other than going to state authorities. Sanctions in such a society are 
private, and are carried out by the victim himself [usually not herself] rather than any 
centralized government.   But private violence carries the risk of retaliation and spiraling of 
violence to higher levels.  The need to limit the escalation of violence requires institutions both 
the define violations and to adjudicate disputes so that parties do not spend too many 
resources in conflict.  The Pashtunwalli provides a rough guideline for legitimate issues to fight 
about, and also a system, the jirga, to resolve disputes once they arise.   It thus presents a 
proto-legal system, co-habiting with, supplementing, and sometimes clashing with the formal 
system of state law.8 
 
The Pashtunwalli does not provide detail rules for every contingency.  As we shall see, the 
normative content of the Pashtunwalli is very fluid, and it is best thought of as a code of honor 
rather than a legal code in the conventional sense.  Legal codes, after all, are products of the 
modernizing state and its impulse of organization.9  Instead, the Pashtunwalli consists of a set 
of meta-rules about the legitimate subjects of conflict and legitimate ways of resolving them.  It 
is a cultural system that channels, and thus limits, private violence. 
 
                                                                
5 Ahmed, Akhbar S. Ahmed, PUKHTUN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A 
TRIBAL SOCIETY 9 (1980). 
6 Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, Working Paper No. 30, 2002. Carnegie Endowment, 
Rule of Law Series: Democracy and the Rule of Law. 
7 Tom Ginsburg and Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy, 45 William and Mary Law Review 1229 (2004).   
8 See Sally Merry, Legal Pluralism, 12 L. SOC. REV. __ (1988). 
9 John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Perez Perdomo, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 26-33 (3RD ed., 2007). 
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Our work is consistent with other recent work on private ordering, stateless peoples, as well as 
the broader literature on social norms.10  The new institutionalism in the social sciences has 
focused attention on the economic functions of legal and quasi-legal norms, showing how they 
can both resolve various institutional problems.11  The gist of this literature is that people have 
great capacity for self-organization.  In contrast with the Hobbesian vision of the state as a 
necessary imposition to prevent people from engaging in endless conflict, we observe the 
possibility of emergent social order that can produce effective systems of law and norms.   
Surely the Pashtunwalli is one of the more vital examples of such a normative system, simply by 
virtue of its geographic spread and temporal resilience, even during periods of extended 
conflict. It thus provides an opportunity to extend our understanding of private ordering.  I 
point out, at the end of the paper, that this functional success comes at a great cost, namely 
the suppression of half the population. In addition to the gender inequities associated with 
Pashtun society, the violence of the region poses further normative problems. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section considers the problem of law in an anarchic 
environments, summarizing recent literature.  We then introduce in Section II the institutions of 
Pashtun society and the norms of the Pashtunwali, analyzing the logic of retaliation and the 
institutional solutions provided by the jirga.  Section III considers the two normative problems 
identified above: gender inequities and relatively high levels of violence of the region.  It 
considers a simple strategy for introducing greater normative coherence to the Pashtunwali 
that might also ameliorate its morally troubling aspects—the expansion of literacy. While not a 
panacea, greater levels of education could potentially facilitate clearer substantive norms as 
well as improved quality of life for women.  Section IV concludes. 
 
 
I. The Problems of Stateless Societies 
 
James C. Scott, in his recent magisterial treatment of upland Southeast Asia, notes that many of 
the histories of the region are fragmentary, and are written from the perspective of the 
governors rather than the governed.12  These accounts depict state-building as a benign and 
even benevolent process of bringing peoples into the fold of the court center, where they can 
enjoy the benefits of civilization.  In actual fact, however, state-building involves massive 
amounts of conscripted labor, capture of populations, and the imposition of hierarchical social 
structures.  Concentrated populations in urban centers were also more subject to disease, 
especially before the emergence of modern scientific medicine.  It is thus not surprising that in 
many times and places, people fled from state building projects to more peripheral geographic 
locales, where they were able to take shelter.  For much of history, “it is abundantly clear that it 
                                                                
10Robert Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991);  Peter Leeson, The Laws of Lawlessness, 38 J. LEG. STUDIES 471 (2009); 
Peter T. Leeson, Gypsies (July, 28 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650182. 
11 See Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990); Douglas North, INSTITUIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1991). 
12 James C. Scott, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 160-61 (2010). 
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was as least as common for people to flee the state as to approach it.”13  For peoples fleeing 
states, private ordering was the best option. 
 
The origins of the Pashtuns are shrouded in mystery, but from what we can tell their history is 
not completely consistent with Scott’s account of Southeast Asia.14   It is true that Pashtuns 
frequently live outside the effective authority of a state, but their history is a bit more 
complicated in that Afghan state-building, such as it is, has also been a Pashtun project.  
Afghanistan as an idea dates back to the 18th century Pashtun leader Ahmed Shah Durrani who 
unified various tribes to form a new state. But that state did not have extensive reach.  It was 
only a the turn of the 20th century that Durrani’s successor  Abdul Rahman Khan began to 
fashion a civilian bureaucracy. 15 Scott characterizes the Pashtuns as having   an “anti-state 
nationalism” that has led not only to demands for a separate autonomous state, but rather the 
maintenance of stateless society.16 Whether these demands for maintaining statelessness are 
the cause or consequence of Afghanistan’s weak state is unclear, but the fact is that the Afghan 
government has not touched the lives of many of its citizens in any positive way. 
 
The Pakistani side of the border has a different history, but the same basic result.  The Pakistani 
portion of the Pashtunistan was part of British India, though administered quite indirectly as a 
remote corner of the Raj.  To this day, the primary governing instrument for Pakistani 
Pashtunistan is a British-era colonial act called the Frontier Crimes Regulation; constitutional 
rights do not apply in the region, and each tribal agency is governed by a “political agent” 
appointed by the center, who wields all executive and judicial power.17  Pakistan has essentially 
ignored the Pashtuns and other “tribals” through a policy of benign neglect.18 
 
Whatever the causes, many Pashtuns receive few services from the states in which they 
nominally live.  Stateless societies, though, need rules just as much as do those with established 
governments.  The difference is that without a state, centralized sanctions cannot be assumed.  
Instead, law in stateless societies must be enforced by communities and individuals themselves. 
One way to think about this is that norms must be self-enforcing, meaning that they are within 
the interests of individuals to comply with even without centralized coercion.19   
                                                                
13 Scott, id. at 162 
14 Walsh, supra n. 4, at 170. 
15Vartan Gregorian, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS OF REFORM AND MODERNIZATION, 1880-1946 at 
134-51 (1969) 
16 Scott, supra n. 12, at 244; see also E.J. Hobsbawm, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 64 (2d ed. 1990) 
17 See Aziz Z. Huq, Mechanisms of Political Capture in Pakistan’s Superior Courts, 10 YBK OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 21, 
28-30 (2006). 
18 See International Crisis Group, Countering Militancy in FATA, Oct. 21, 2009.  
19 See Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007, Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative 
Organization of Clans, Ruhr Economic Papers 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 





In a very different context—namely international law—Professor McAdams and I explored how 
adjudicative institutions can be effective even without effective sanctions.20   The central 
argument is that legal institutions can work by coordinating private expectations of other 
parties’ likely behavior.  The theory relies on a class of games in which players wish to 
coordinate their behavior, but disagree over how to coordinate.21  Consider for example a pair 
of disputants engaged in a fight over land.  Each wants to maintain possession of a piece of 
property, and so signals to the other that they will fight hard to keep it.  But fighting is costly 
and socially destructive. Other things equal, each disputant would prefer not to fight.  However, 
revealing this preference would induce the other party to be more aggressive about pursuing 
the property.  This situation is captured in the “Hawk-Dove” game, and represents a common 
social situation.22  
 
In the Hawk-Dove game, Hawk represents the aggressive strategy, while Dove represents the 
passive strategy.  Each player would prefer to play Hawk to the other’s Dove.  If both players 
play the aggressive Hawk strategy, however, a fight ensues.  On the other hand, if both play the 
passive Dove strategy, neither gets the property, which is suboptimal from a social perspective.  
Each player’s preference ordering is such that they wish to coordinate with the other party, so 
as to avoid a costly fight, but disagree over how to coordinate their behavior. 
 
How might law without central enforcement resolve this problem? Suppose that the two 
disputants cannot resolve a problem.  Each mobilizes their supporters—relatives, friends, and 
community members and asserts that they will fight to win the dispute.  The situation now 
threatens to escalate, potentially harming many members of the community.  Suppose next 
that someone—a local notable, a neighbor, or even a judge--steps forward to help resolve the 
dispute. This person has no coercive power over the disputants, but after hearing evidence, 
pronounces that one side or the other is in the right.  One side of the dispute is surely happy. 
But consider the situation from the perspective of the loser.23 The loser is unhappy about the 
result, and must decide whether or not to comply.  No doubt the loser’s first choice would be 
not to comply; but knowing that the other party has “won” the loser may suspect that the 
winner will be more recalcitrant and less likely to back down. Further, the winner’s supporters 
may be willing to help him, whereas the loser’s supporters, expecting the winning side to 
defend their claim, may now back down.  In such a situation, the adjudicators’ decision may in 
fact be self-fulfilling, in that parties’ expectation about others’ behavior may lead to compliance 
without centralized sanctions. 
 
We believe that such situations are common in stateless societies. In medieval Iceland, for 
example, there were no centralized enforcement bodies, but a set of courts issued rulings that 
                                                                
20 Ginsburg and McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy, supra n. 7. 
21 Richard McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1043 (2005). 
22 Id. 
23 Martin Shapiro, COURTS 3 (1980) 
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typically were complied with by private actors.24 We believe that one of the mechanisms for 
compliance was that the legal announcement created common knowledge, so that the 
disputants and others in the society updated their assessments about the likely behavior by the 
other party. Even without directly imposed sanctions, law can make a difference if it shapes 
private beliefs in the likely strategies of other players. The job of legal institutions in such 
settings is to coordinate private behavior rather than coerce it.   
 
Like medieval Iceland, the Pashtunwalli is an example of a system of non-state norms and 
institutions in which self-help and non-coercive adjudication are the chief mechanisms of 
resolving problems.  The key is to have norms and institutions that can coordinate private 




II. The Pashtunwalli and the Institutions of Pashtun Society 
 
A. Honor and Democracy 
 
The Pashtunwalli (sometimes spelled Pashtunwali or Pushtunwali) is usually translated as the 
tribal code or tribal law of the Pashtuns.   Though referred to as a code, it is more a code of 
behavior or honor than a legal code.  The rules are not written down, and many of them involve 
the central concept of nang, usually translated as honor. Certain actions are seen as helping to 
build honor, while others are seen as hurting it.  One can think of nang as loosely analogous to a 
positive reputation, a capital good that is accumulated over time, and can be lost.  
 
Pashtun society is noted for its lack of hierarchy: each Pashtun male is equal and a possessor of 
unassailable rights,25  though there is deference given to elders and those who attain leadership 
positions. A gun is an essential possession, and serves as an equalizing force.26  The Pashtunwali 
has also become an object of fascination and revulsion from outside for its treatment of 
women. Women are inferior and subordinate, but are also a locus of honor, to be protected 
above all.27  Dishonoring a man’s wife is certain cause for conflict.   
 
The society is segmentary, meaning that it is comprised of numerous small self-regulating 
groups that periodically come together to form a larger group.28  Such societies are riven by 
conflict. As one scholar puts it “rivalry and status competition is a key defining element within 
                                                                
24 DAVID FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER (2001); William Ian Miller, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW AND SOCIETY IN 
SAGA ICELAND (1990); Ginsburg and McAdams, supra n. 7. 
25 Willi Steul, PASCHTUNWALI: EIN EHRENKODEX UND SEINE RECHTLICH RELEVANZ 309 (1981). 
26 Walsh, supra n. 4, at  165. 
27 Steul, supra n. 25, at 310. 
28 Ahmad supra n. 5, 81-125 
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as well as between the elements of the segments.”29  Tarborwali or cousin rivalry and siyali or 
status envy are key factors, so that even within small family groups there are sources of tension 
and centrifugal pressure.30 But when faced with external pressures, segmentary societies are 
capable of coordinating action against outsiders.  Hence, we see the long Pashtun history of 
successful repulsion of foreign invaders, who in modern times include the British, the Russians 
and the Americans. 
 
Preserving honor is essential in a stateless society, particularly one that is segmentary. The risk 
of stateless societies is that stronger actors will prey on weaker ones.  Stronger actors will be 
aggressive, assuming that weaker actors will play a passive strategy in the Hawk-Dove game 
described above. Why does the concept of honor help?  Honor norms may emerge in situations 
in which each member of the society has private information on his ability to defend himself 
and to assert claims.31  To avoid becoming a target of predatory attack, each actor has an 
incentive to signal that he is willing to assert and defend himself, which in turn can crystallize 
into norms about honor.32  Honor norms deter aggressors from engaging in predatory behavior, 
since they force all individuals to signal that they will play the Hawkish strategy.  Still, there will 
inevitably be conflict. If even the weak have an incentive to signal that they will fight, strong 
players will not be sure who to prey on, and may make a mistake.  This leads to conflict, and a 




 A central institution in village life is the jirga (or shura), an institution common to central Asian 
tribes that consists of a public meeting of the notables of the community.  The term is familiar 
to some in the West for the loya jirga, or grand jirga, called on periodically to decide national 
affairs of the various Afghan tribes, but jirga are more common at local levels where they 
decide disputes.  Jirgas are formed by local notables, who are neither elected nor appointed, 
but are seen as having the wisdom and knowledge to resolve disputes. 
 
From our perspective, jirga is a key institution for coordination in an internally riven society. In a 
jirga procedure, each member of the jirga has equal status and deliberation is open.  (Though  
open to the public, women and children are not typically allowed to attend.) A jirga will involve 
people connected with one or the other side in equal proportions.  All sit in a circle as formal 
equals and each is permitted to speak. There is no fixed time period for deliberation: some 
cases takes weeks.  Sanctions can include ostracism, fines and the specification of a por.33 
                                                                
29Craig Cordell Naumann, The Pashtunwali’s Relevance as a Tool of Solving the “Afghan Crisis” Research Report 
submitted to the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies (2009), at 131. 
30 Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 3; 94 (“Cousin rivalry levels as it consumes the Pukhtun. The father’s brother’s son is the 
bane of his existence and main rival for power and status.”) 
31 McAdams book 
32 RICHARD E. NESBITT AND DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH (1991). 




Before a jirga session, a bond is sometimes collected from the parties and given to a third 
person for safekeeping.34 This bond can take the form of cash, property, guns, or even a person 
who is pledged to guarantee enforceability.  A party that does not accept the decision will have 
to forfeit the bond.  Jirga decisions are not written down, hardly surprising given low rates of 
literacy. Nevertheless, good decisions are seen as having precedential value.35 There is no 
formal structure of appeal, but parties can ask for a second jirga to be formed to review the 
case if unhappy with the first decision. There is no way to know how frequent this form of 
appeal is, but many descriptions leave this feature out, so it is probable that most jirga are able 
to resolve disputes on the first try, or alternatively that disputants do not try again when the 
first jirga fails. 
 
The institutional structure of the jirga means that its decisions are common knowledge among 
the disputants, and the other members of the community.36  Common knowledge refers to the 
idea that we are all aware of the content of the decision, but also that we know that we share 
this knowledge.  Not only do I know that the decision has been issued, but I know that you 
know, and that everyone else knows.  As Benson puts it: “In order for a dispute to end 
satisfactorily, a decision has to be acceptable—verifiable—not just to the parties most directly 
affected, but to the groups or firms representing these parties and to groups who, although not 
directly involved, might be drawn into a confrontation with of the groups in the dispute under 
consideration.”37  A public pronouncement that A or B is correct will inform not only the parties 
about each others’ likely behavior, but also inform others who might join one side or the other 
as allies. If B loses a case, B’s relative now have an excuse to beg off from the battle, since they 
can argue that A’s relatives will fight harder for the right in question.  This in turn affects the 
disputants’ assessment about whether it is worth continuing to fight.  Common knowledge 
facilitates dispute resolution. 
 
Besides the jirga there are other institutions of Afghan village life: a malik, who holds a kind 
executive authority and may be a local notable or literate person whose function is to interact 
with the state on behalf of the community; and a mullah, who is the repository of religious law. 
Islamic law or sharia differs from the Pashtun norms in a number of areas, including the rights 
of women.38 The relationship among these authorities and with the jirga is quasi-constitutional 
in that it involves a separation of powers of sorts, in which each body derives authority from a 
                                                                
34 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan 8 (2004), available at www.theILF.org 
[hereafter ILF] 
35 ILF, supra n. 34, at 9 
36 Michael Chwe,  RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2001). 
37 Benson, Bruce, Customary Law with Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description of 
a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion. Journal of Libertarian Studies 9(2): 25, 36 (1990) 
38 Proof of adultery in Islam requires the testimony of four male witnesses, but in Pashtunwalli can be based on 
hearsay.  Women have no right to inherit under Pashtunwali, and can almost never divorce. Richard Tod Strickland, 
The Way of the Pashtun: Pasthunwali, 10 Canadian Army Journal 44, 52 (2007). 
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different source of legitimacy.39   Mullahs represent Islam, jirgas reflect the will of the 
community, and maliks derive their authority from a mix of sources, including level of 
education, position in the social structure, or wealth.    
 
One can think of the structure as involving three competing authorities, preventing the 
dominance of any one of them.  If a dispute arises, one can go to the malik or mullah, or the 
jirga itself.  Even within a jirga, parties can choose the governing law, either sharia or 
pashtunwalli (meaning the local customary variant in this context). The competition among 
authorities means that any one institution has a greater incentive to provide a substantively 
just decision, or at least one capable of being enforced.40 Otherwise, the institution will not be 
utilized in the future, and its members would lose status. Without the centralized enforcement 
machinery of a modern state, compliance will depend on the attitudes of the members of the 
society, and this forms a constraint on decision-makers.   
 
Of the various institutions, the jirga seems to have the highest normative authority, as befits a 
society of radical democracy, though this will depend on particular times and places, and in 
particular the relationship with the outside world.   Indeed, while the structure has been 
remarkably enduring, it has come under some pressure in recent years.  The Taliban sought to 
promote sharia over the pashtunwali, and placed the mullah at the center of the village, 
undermining traditional structures.41 War has also disrupted structures, as the commanders 
displace the traditional jirga.  The actual situation of village governance at any particular time 
and place, then, is quite fluid. 
 
In institutional terms, the jirga has an advantage over others in that its decision is issued in 
public among the representatives of the entire community.  It is therefore not surprising that 
outsiders—the state, the Taliban—have sought to undermine the jirga and to promote the 
authority of the malik and mullah.  In essence, outsiders seek to end the stateless, self-
regulating character of the community, and to provide channels for outside interests to 
determine important policies.  Yet the institutions of local society have remained remarkably 
persistent and hence resistant to state-building efforts. 
 
 
C. Norms of the Pashtunwalli 
 
Because the Pashtuns are largely illiterate, their tribal code is not an actual written legal code.  
The actual substantive norms that are applied may differ from place to place and are of fairly 
simple elaboration: wrongs involve death, physical injury, offenses against the sexual purity of  
women, and injuries to honor or rights.42  Yet Pashtuns talk about the Pashtunwalli as if it were 
                                                                
39Jennifer Brick Murtazashvli, The Microfoundations Of State Building: Informal Institutions And Local Public Goods 
In Rural Afghanistan, PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science University of Wisconsin, Madison (2009). 
40 Ginsburg and McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy, supra n. 7. 
41 Murtazashvli, supra n. 39, at 82.   
42 Steul supra n. 25, at 311. 
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a unified code. How can this be?  The analogy here may to privately developed language.43  
Although language in most places is not centrally regulated, the spontaneous development of 
language allows it to spread over a large geographic scope.  There are, to be sure, local 
variations in the way English is spoken in various jurisdictions around the world, but the basic 
rules are such as to allow someone from Cornwall to communicate with people from California 
and Calcutta. Similarly, different villages and regions have different versions of the tribal code, 
yet it bears enough unity to be considered a single object. 
 
The Pashtunwalli is noteworthy for its simplicity.  It contains very few rules of substantive law, 
mostly revolving around the protection of one’s own honor and the honor of women (the latter 
referred to as tor).44  Gender segregation rules, or purdah, are rigidly enforced.45 The central 
concepts are behavioral and involve the specification of compensation to be offered for a set of 
loosely defined wrongs.  A primary norm is to uphold individual, group, and tribal honor. Thus 
when one’s honor is harmed, one has a normative duty to respond using one of the modalities 
of the Pashtunwalli. This section describes the norms in greater detail. 
 
1) Hospitality, Revenge, Submission 
 
The Pashtunwalli is conventionally described as composing three key concepts. melmastia, 
hospitality;  badal, revenge; and nanawati, submission or asylum.46 Specific bad actions are 
accompanied by nerkhs, the recognized sanction to be imposed.  These can consists of fine or 
debt (por) to be paid as compensation for liability (tawan); or other means.  The content of the 
por can involve compensation in cash or women, and there is a preference for women as it is 
seen as binding the families together, thus reducing the risk of future flare-ups.47  In case of an 
ordinary murder among the Ahmedzai for example, two young women are required to be 
transferred to the other party.48 The practice, known as swara, an object of fascination and 
repulsion for the outside world.49  
 
Let us examine each of the central concepts.50 Melmastia, or hospitality, involves the 
requirement of giving shelter and protection (panah) to those who ask for it, even if the person 
is a criminal.  There are anecdotal stories of families giving protection to people who have just 
                                                                
43 Benson supra n. 37, at 28. 
44 Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 3, 202. 
45 Palwasha Kakar, Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority 4-6 (2003) (unpublished research 
paper, Harvard University), available at http:// www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf  
46 James Spain, PATHANS OF THE LATTER DAY 42 (1995) ; see also Spain, THE WAY OF THE PATHANS, 2nd Edition (1972). 
47 The Economist, Pushtunwali, December 19, 2006; Walsh, supra n. 4, at 177. 
48 ILF, supra n. 34, at 11. 
49 Ashfaq Yusufzai, Blood Feuds Trap Girls in ‘Compensation Marriages’, IPS News, April 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32737 
50 See generally Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 90-91 
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killed a family member, and maintaining the panah. Once the perpetrator leaves the home, 
however, he may be killed.  On the other hand, someone who injures a guest will have to pay 
por to the shelterer, whose honor has been implicitly violated. 
 
Badal or revenge allows one to seek retribution against someone who has caused one harm. 
There is some evidence that revenge should be greater than the initial slight, as captured in the 
proverb “He is not a Pukhtun (sic) who does not give a blow for a pinch.”51 While decentralized 
sanctions carried out by the victim are common in societies without state law, the Pashtunwali 
is unusual in imposing an affirmative duty to seek revenge: failing to do so will cause one to 
suffer a reputational sanction in being thought of as a coward.  For example in the case of 
murder of one’s relative, the reputational sanction creates a partial duty to kill a member of the 
aggressor’s group.   
 
This duty is not perfect. An alternative to being killed is to ask for nanawati, a formal apology 
that consists of symbolic submission of the wrongdoer to the victim’s family. A sincere offer of 
nanawati is to be accepted.  Nanawati can also involve the relatives of the wrongdoer.  For 
example, in a case of a murder, the murderer’s relatives may help carry the victim’s body to the 
grave or accompany the wrongdoer to the victim’s house to slaughter one or more sheep. 
 
We can now summarize the Pashtunwalli in a few simple principles: 
 
1) Honor is paramount and the honor of women is to be protected. 
2) Gender boundaries must be rigidly maintained. 
3) One has a right to compensation or por when one is wronged. 
4) Revenge is tolerated and even encouraged. 
5) Apologies accompanied by por are to be accepted. 
6) Guests are to be sheltered. 
7) The jirga is to be obeyed. 
 
These rules are not, obviously, a detailed code of substantive rules of conduct like a true legal 
code.  But they do provide a framework for behavior and for managing conflict among people.  




Let us provide some example of how the system works in practice from Pakistan. Two Waziris, 
Haji Sardar and Shah Tofan, had a dispute over water allocation.52  The dispute escalated and 
Haji Sardar’s son shot and killed Shah Tofan’s son.  Haji Sardar’s family was then forced to leave.  
Village elders then stepped in and decided that the underlying dispute and resultant murder 
should be resolved by the murderer’s family give two girls and 300,000 Pakistani Rupees to the 
                                                                
51 Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 90; Walsh, supra n. 4, at 290 (“You kill two of my people; I will kill ten of yours.”) 
52 The following draws on ILF, supra n. 34, at 12-13. 
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family of Shah Tofan.  Shah Tofan’s family, in turn, was required to provide a girl for marriage 
into Haji Sardar’s family, in order to signify their acceptance of the Jirga’s decision.  Shah Tofan 
ultimately rejected the cash payment, but agreed to the exchange of girls. The jirga decision 
effectively resolved the dispute.   
 
In another case, a farmer borrowed money from a local businessman and pledge his 
forthcoming poppy crops as collateral.53 But a severe drought destroyed the poppy crop, so the 
farmer could not repay his loan.  In response to a demand for repayment, as well as in any 
attempt to gain sympathy, “the farmer explained that he only had his wife and children to offer 
in exchange for his debt. . . .  To the farmer’s surprise, the businessman demanded that the 
farmer turn his family over to repay the loan.  The farmer told his wife and children to go with 
the businessman, but as they were leaving the house, the farmer retrieved his rifle and shot 
and killed the businessman.”  When the jirga heard the case, they decided that the farmer was 
not required to pay compensation to the victim’s family.54  In this second case, one sees that 
the businessman violated implicit norms, probably because asking for the man’s wife violated 
norms of protecting women’s honor. 
 
 
D. The Logic of Mandatory Retaliation 
 
As the examples make clear, the Pashtunwalli relies for its efficacy on the threat of collective 
retaliation for wrongs suffered by a family member.   Blood feud has been found in other pre-
modern societies and persists in other places around the world. In such societies, revenge is not 
merely an option but a duty.55    The duty to blood feud can be thought of as providing a 
credible deterrent to murder.  Knowing that a potential victim will be dishonored if he does not 
seek revenge, a potential aggressor will assume a high probability of response and hence will be 
more reluctant to engage in aggressive action.  This is somewhat offset by the fact that a 
revenge killing must be accompanied with por. Thus if a member of group A kills a member of 
group B, A will owe compensation; but B can choose to seek revenge, in which case B will have 
to compensate A for any deaths. This device serves to prevent escalation: B will not want to kill 
three A’s, but will seek to kill only one so the por will offset.56 
 
In equilibrium, a society with mandatory blood feud might be expected to be one with low 
levels of violence.  In fact, however, we observe a good deal of violence in Pashtun society.  
                                                                
53 ILF, supra n. 34, at 19. 
54 ILF, supra n. 34, at 19. 
55 PETER STEIN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 10-11(1984); Adamson Hoebel THE LAW OF 
PRIMITIVE MAN 87 (1967). 
56 Other norms include limitations on shooting during village level conflicts, and conceding defeat after capture of a 
village well. See Akhbar S. Ahmed, PUKHTUN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
A TRIBAL SOCIETY 5 (1980). 
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Indeed, the response and counter response frequently results in a spiral of violence. Why might 
this be? 
 
First, the culture of honor and reputational considerations in a stateless environment mean 
that, notwithstanding the universal interest in avoiding conflict, parties will act aggressively 
when they enter into Hawk-Dove interactions. The penalty from playing Dove is very high in 
such an environment.  Without a centralized state to protect the weak, stronger actors may 
attack them with impunity.  As Thucydides classically put it “the strong do what they can and 
the weak suffer what they must.”57 When a dispute arises, both sides will frequently signal that 
they will play Hawk and refuse to back down, leading to a good deal of conflict. Since failure to 
respond is a source of dishonor, people may be overly quick to respond, leading to high levels 
of aggressive behavior. The emphasis on honor may thus be related to the need to avoid being 
seen as a patsy or sucker.58  
 
Second, ambiguities in the underlying norms might contribute to conflict.59 If parties are 
uncertain about the precise rules that govern their interaction, there may be cases in which 
each side genuinely believes that the norm is on their side.  Thus they will play an aggressive 
strategy in the encounter, leading to conflict. Normative ambiguity is conflict generating. 
 
Third, even if the norms are clear, there may be disagreement about facts.60  Suppose that two 
farmers have land next to each other and discover a valuable resource, say a spring, on the 
boundary between them. The farmers may both agree that the spring belongs to the owner of 
the underlying land.  But they may disagree about the precise boundary line.  Such disputes are 
frequent in areas without state-organized cadastral systems. While farmers are capable of 
marking boundaries without the state, it may have not been worth delimiting the precise 
boundary, for example if the land was marginal before discovery of the valuable resource. 
 
All these factors mean that it may be helpful to have a third party to help the parties to avoid 
conflict.  The jirga serves in part to help coordinate the understandings of wrongdoing and to 
resolve the Hawk-Dove problem.  At a jirga, the disputants will make their claims (sometimes 
through proxies), and the community pronounces a decision.  The deliberation will allow the 
members to come to a common view.  Because the parties will observe the process, they will 
have common knowledge of the proposed solutions and will change their expectations about 
the strategy to be played by the other party.  The jirga itself does not typically punish one side 
or the other but simply facilitates the operation of private sanctions by announcing the por.  
(Note though that in extreme cases, a jirga can expel someone from a village or burn a house 
down, so there is some capacity for collective enforcement.  But in most cases the jirga simply 
announces a remedy that is privately enforced among the parties.)   
                                                                
57 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War Book V, 89 
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Note, though, that the jirga often comes into play after disputes have arisen. It is not really a 
lawmaking body that announces generally binding norms, but rather enforces rules that are 
known to all, or makes collective decisions. Thus the lack of ex ante clarity about norms can 
contribute to violent conflict. 
 
Another reason Pashtun society may be violent is that it occupies economically marginal 
territory, and hence is not a wealthy society.  Societies with a large social surplus will typically 
observe the monetization of sanctions, so that restitution will be paid in money.  In a society 
that is relatively poor, however, other forms of compensation will be used instead of scarce 
cash.  Indeed the use of women as a form of compensation may be explained this way. Women 
are particularly useful as a form of compensation in that they intertwine the families of the 
disputants across generations and hence serve to reduce the incentive to engage in violence. 
 
The lack of resources may in part explain why the Pashtu tribal areas have been left essentially 
ungoverned by modern states into the 21st century.  States will take territory when the benefits 
of doing so outweigh the costs in terms of securing the territory from other states and 
providing services to the local population.  If there are few resources to be had, the benefits of 
control are minimal. In turn, the character of the tribal society, in which each Pashtu is armed, 
raises the costs of securing the territory. For most modern states, it seems, Pashtunistan is a 
loss operation and governments have left it with minimal government. At the same time, 
Afghanistan as a whole is something of a “rentier state” in which foreign powers have 
historically been manipulated and exploited to obtain support. 61 
 
Note that in many of the examples discussed so far, money plays a role. A bond is seen as 
essential for a jirga decision, and por is a core part of the system.  This point bears some 
consideration, for it implies that honor is fungible and can be restored not only through 
violence but material conmpensation.62  Note that women are also seen as a means of 
compensation; nang is quite different from our own notions of honor. But this expanded notion 
of different “currencies” of compensation helps to reduce the level of violence among groups. A 
Pashtun world where only violence could restore honor would be a violent one indeed. 
 
Though much of the literature emphasizes restitution as the point of sanctions, in fact the 
Pashtunwalli sanctions seem to involve both restitution and an element of deterrence.  When 
someone steals private property, the stolen goods must be returned along with a penalty.63  
This makes sense from an economic perspective in order to deal with the possibility of non-
                                                                
61 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System 
48-49 (1995)    
62 I am indebted to Aziz Huq for this analysis.   
63 ILF, supra n. 34, at 16. 
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detection: if only restitution were required, then there would be under-deterrence.64  The 
additional penalty helps to approach the optimal level of punishment to deter theft. 
 
In sum, Pashtun society is violent, but has robust mechanisms to manage conflict. We see the 
nanawati and the jirga as devices designed to minimize the endless spiral of violence in the 
blood feud. Perversely, however, these institutions may facilitate the seeking of badal, as the 
perpetrator knows that the tit-for-tat will not be infinite.  In addition, the institution of paid 
compensation for retaliation, just as if one was a primary perpetrator, disincentivizes retaliation 
and makes initial violation more likely.  We thus see a society with an equilibrium level of 




III. Norm Change 
 
This section considers strategies for norm change in the Pashtun region.  It first identifies two 
major targets for reform: the treatment of women and high levels of violence. It then considers 
literacy as a key background condition for norm change. 
 
A. The Treatment of Women 
 
This section considers some of the more problematic norms of the Pashtun code. Of these, the 
treatment of women has received a good deal of popular attention, but has been little 
researched.65  Many norms of the Pashtunwalli concern women and the protection of their 
honor.  The kidnapping of a married woman is punished to the level of seven murders, which 
apparently has some deterrent effect, as cases are rarely found. Kidnapping other women is 
also punished severely.66  Adulterers (both male and female) are killed without a requirement 
of por.  A woman who does not resist rape will be deemed complicit and killed.  In some cases, 
these killings will be carried out by family members eager to redeem their honor.67  For 
example, Ahmad recounts a case in which a married couple arrives in a village, and the son of a 
villager begins having an affair with the wife.  When the villager is informed he holds a feast, 
asks everyone to pray, and then pulls out a revolver to shoot his own son.  He then hands the 
revolver to the husband of the adulterer, who shoots his own wife.  The villager then declares 
the husband his legal son, and marries him to his dead son’s wife.68 
 
                                                                
64 Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 31 Tulane 
Law Review 235 (1986). 
65 Kakar, supra n. 45. 
66 See e.g., Walsh, supra n. 4, at 173 (describing kidnapping of women and severe response.) 
67 Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 204. 
68 Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 205. 
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Though women’s honor is central, they are in no sense equal to men.  The forced transfer of 
women as compensation makes them seem akin to property.  Paradoxically, and much like 
slaves in the antebellum south, women have high value and are also to be protected.  For 
example, a man who injures or kills his wife can be subject to a claim of por by her father, 
leading to a justified killing if the por is refused. But women’s agency and legal personality is 
highly restricted.  For example, women are not able to inherit land under many versions of the 
Pashtunwalli, in direct contradiction with the Sharia.69  Among some groups of Pashtun, only 
elderly women and young children are allowed to leave the house without a complete veil.70 
The rules of purdah mean that women are often denied access to health care and education.71 
 
To be sure, women do have some social space in Pashtun society, but it is generally a private 
one.72  There are certain realms, however, in which senior married women have authority, 
including marriage decisions for the children, household management and resource allocation, 
and even arbitrating disputes.73 There are, of course, significant local differences, with women 
in sedentary Pashtun tribes having more authority than those in nomadic tribes.74 
 
The transfer of human beings is obviously in grave conflict with modern notions of morality and 
with international human rights law.  More broadly, Pashtun practices violate virtually every 
provision of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and 
the equality provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.75  Yet Afghanistan was 
one of the original states to approve the Universal Declaration in 1948; it has acceded to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to the CEDAW.  It is worth considering, 
then, how the Pashtunwali might be modified to comply with international norms.  
 
B. The Prevalence of Violence 
 
A second area in which the Pashtunwali seems normatively problematic is the regulation of 
violence.  Pashtun areas tend to have high rates of murder and violence, even if they also have 
high levels of social order. While statistics are not easily available, anecdotal evidence from the 
Tribal areas of Afghanistan suggests this is the case. 
 
C. Imposed Solutions? 
 
                                                                
69 See, eg. Ahmed, supra n. 5, at 50 (shift from Pashtun custom to sharia meant that women could legally inherit in 
one Pakistani district, but rarely practiced.) Strickland, supra, at 52. 
70 Kakar, supra n. 45 at 5. 
71 Id. 
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73 Kakar, supra n. 45, at 8-9 
74 Kakar, supra n. 45, at 9. 
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We thus see two major normative problems with the Pashtunwalli.  One concerns the 
treatment of women, the other concerns the high levels of violence associated with the region.   
What should Western governments that are concerned about these issues do about the 
Pashtunwalli?  By far the dominant approach to date has been to build up institutions of state 
law that are ultimately designed to displace tribal custom in favor of more Western or universal 
norms.76   Extending the reach of the Afghan state would allow the government to comply with 
its international obligations while also eliminating more egregious violations of human rights 
norms. 
 
Unfortunately, this approach is unlikely to succeed.  The historic weakness of the centralized 
state in Afghanistan is one factor.  The Pashtunwalli fits poorly with state norms.77  
Furthermore, the Pashtunwalli has proved resistant even to the more liberal provisions of 
Islamic law with regard to the treatment of women; mutatis mutandis, it is less likely to 
accommodate norms that originate with infidel Europeans.  
 
Perversely, attempts to spread human rights norms to the Pashtun areas, particularly regarding 
the treatment of women, may actually increase violence by undermining the Pashtunwali.  To 
understand this, suppose there was a rule that compensation for disputes could no longer 
include the transfer of women from one disputing side to another.  This would mean that 
compensation would have to be paid in cash.  Cash, because it is fungible, is an inferior device 
to bond disputants together across generations.  So one might expect that the scale of 
compensation might rise—if we can no longer give two young women in exchange for a 
woman, demand for the substitute (currency) will increase.   But the basic poverty of the region 
limits how much upward pressure is feasible on cash compensation. Ultimately this may mean 
that there is less deterrence from wrongdoing, and more violence.  To put the matter simply, 
knowing that my daughters are not at risk, I am more likely, not less likely, to pick a fight with 
my neighbor.78   
 
At the same time, a switch to such a system would have the advantage of reducing the 
oppression of women.  The treatment of women in Pashtun society is so severe that this 
tradeoff may be worthwhile.  I simply point out the internal tensions between trying to solve 
the gender problem and the violence problem at the same time, given the political economic 
logic of the Pashtunwalli. 
 
D. Non-state strategies for Norm Change 
 
                                                                
76 Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia and J. Alexander Their, Defininng Success in Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 
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77 Ahmad, supra n. 5, at 94, tells the story of an elder pleading with the ethnographer to arrange bail for a man in 
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78 To be sure, another possibility is that the inadequacy of money as a deterrent means that if you dishonor your 
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Imposing norms from outside is rarely as effective as bottom-up strategies. This is particularly 
true with regard to legal institutions in this part of the world. The assumption that the rule of 
law could be built through the construction of formal state-centered legal institutions in 
Afghanistan seems to have been overly optimistic.79   It thus makes sense to consider how 
norms can be changed from below. There are some comparative and historical examples of 
deeply entrenched social norms being changed rather quickly with the right combination of 
incentives, and these might have some relevance to the Pashtunwalli.80   
 
Let us begin with violence.  If the above analysis is correct, much of the violence of Pashtun 
society has to do with norms of honor that lead to aggressive responses to insults.  However, 
we have also emphasized the ambiguity of the norms themselves as being a source of 
uncertainty.  The instruction not to dishonor one’s fellows is pitched at a fairly high level of 
abstraction, with its actual content determined in very local circumstances.  It follows that 
clearer norms might in fact reduce the level of conflict.   
 
How might outsiders increase the precision and certainty of the Pashtunwalli?  One way to do 
so is to recognize that the system is essentially one of dispute resolution, but not norm 
generation.  Dispute resolution is effective for dealing with the past.  Full-fledged legal systems, 
however, also have ways of articulating norms for the future.  Courts routinely engage in both 
functions, helping to articulate new rules through the resolution of old disputes.81  This in turn 
can reduce the number of disputes in the future, as potential litigants have a clearer idea of 
what norms will be enforced.  Precedent is conflict reducing. 
 
Our proposal is to domesticate the Pashtunwalli by appearing to reinforce it. To do so requires 
the introduction of literacy and a recording system for jirga decisions.  Literacy would have two 
effects.  First of all, it would allow jirga decisions to be recorded, and thus to potentially have 
precedential value beyond the living memories of current villagers.  Recording jirga decisions 
would make the Pashtunwalli stronger, not weaker—but might also minimize disputes because 
it would allow future disputants to know what the rules are in advance.  To give an example, 
the businessman in the second case noted in Part II.B above would have been aware that he 
could not legitimately demand the wife of a debtor (though he may have been able to demand 
a daughter), and hence would not have made the fatal error of asking for the wife. 
 
Crucially, introducing literacy is consistent with demands emanating from tribal society.  As 
documented in Greg Mortensen’s Three Cups of Tea,  there is a great deal of demand for 
education among the rural Pashtuns and other Afghans living in villages.82  Whatever it’s other 
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developmental benefits, literacy has the potential to improve the operation of the indigenous 
village-level norms as captured in the Pashtunwali.   Framing the recording system as being 
designed to reinforce, rather than undermine, the Pashtunwalli will also make the proposal 
more palatable.  Literacy could transform the Pashtunwalli from a code of honor toward a real 
code of law. 
 
How would literacy address the other normative concern about the Pashtunwalli, namely the 
treatment of women?  Literacy, if extended to all, might help to improve the lot of women, 
though the predictions here are a little more ambiguous.   
 
As an initial matter here, it is worth pointing out that the most egregious abuses of women 
seem to happen in the context of disputes.  If literacy made for clearer law, there might be less 
disputing and hence less need for remedies, including the abhorrent practice of swara. This 
alone would be of normative value, though it does not address the core structure of gender 
inequalities. 
 
More broadly, other examples of normative change have relied on relatively equal levels of 
education and literacy between men and women.83 Female literacy in Afghanistan has risen 
dramatically since 2001, but it is still appallingly low.  Illiteracy no doubt weakens women’s 
relative status in society, and there seems to be a genuinely high level of demand among rural 
women for more education.84  Educating women would no doubt increase their ability to 
contribute to the household economy, and would itself go a long way toward improving their 
status.  Literacy would also allow women to learn about international norms.  One might even 
imagine women using a system of recorded decisions to demand improvements in the rules, as 
they shop for relatively egalitarian decisions that push norms in the direction of better 
treatment. 
 
Literacy might also affect the Pashtunwalli through improving development more generally.  
We know that the norms of blood-feud and such tend to be less strong among more urban and 
educated Pashtuns.85  Richer, more educated people are less likely to practice gender violence 
as well.  
 
The caveat, of course, is ensuring that all have access to literacy.  Designing a program wherein 
women as well as men are guaranteed education is beyond the scope of this short article, but 
there is evidence that it is occurring in some regions.86 If literacy were restricted to males, it 
might have some effects through its general effect on development but would actually 
disempower women even further within the family and village.  It is also possible that selective 
introduction of literacy could undermine the Pashtunwalli by introducing status differences 
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among the men.  As described above, one of the important norms of Pashtun society is the 
equality of all males.  If power and wealth differences are exacerbated,  the equality norm itself 
might be undermined.87   
 
Still, the literacy proposal has the advantage of being consistent with local demands, and having 
the potential to disrupt the most abusive practices of the normative order.  It would allow an 
organic evolution in the substantive Pashtunwalli, while preserving the procedural institutions 
which are essential to governance in a region where the state’s reach is likely to remain limited 





The Pashtunwalli is one of the larger “quasi-legal” systems in the world in terms of the number 
of people subject to it, and it may be the largest of any stateless society.  We have explained 
how many of its norms and institutions seem designed to minimize the escalation of private 
violence, and hence preserve social order in an area where state law has minimal reach.  This 
case study provides some evidence that adjudication in anarchy can be functionally effective, 
even if it is embedded in a set of norms that violate the rights of half the population. 
 
At the same time, we see that the rules themselves are ambiguous.  This creates situations in 
which conflict erupts with great frequency. Norms of honor probably make conflict more 
prevalent than it would otherwise be, and the dispute resolution system, by minimizing the 
chance of escalation, may actually encourage quickness to claim injury.  The jirga system, of 
course, is the backbone of rural society in this region, and we do not assert that it should be 
replaced.  Rather what is needed is an evolution in substantive norms to be applied within the 
Pashtunwalli framework. 
 
We propose a simple solution to facilitate normative evolution: writing.  A system of precedent 
would reduce the ambiguities about what counts as a violation and what level of private 
retaliation for wrongs is acceptable.  This would in turn have the effect of minimizing violations 
while coordinating punishments.  This solution is one which takes advantage of the 
decentralized nature of Pashtu society—it does not impose top down norms, even in the 
contentious area of the treatment of women, but might ultimately facilitate convergence with 
more universal standards.  They key is to leverage bottom-up sources of social ordering rather 
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